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DRAINING THE SWAMP REQUIRES ROBUST 




 † The authors thank Matt Stock for his contributions to the sections on the IRS and SEC whistleblower-
reward programs and Dylan Yépez for his editing. 
 ∗ Jason Zuckerman litigates whistleblower-retaliation, qui tam, wrongful-discharge, discrimination, non-
compete, and other employment-related claims, and authors the Whistleblower Protection Law Blog. His 
broad experience includes practicing employment law at a national law firm, serving as a Principal at The 
Employment Law Group, and serving as Senior Legal Advisor to the Special Counsel at the U.S. Office of 
Special Counsel, the federal agency charged with protecting whistleblowers in the federal government. In 
2012, the Secretary of Labor appointed Zuckerman to serve on the Whistleblower Protection Advisory 
Committee, which makes recommendations to the Secretary of Labor to improve OSHA’s administration of 
federal whistleblower protections.  
He has lectured extensively on whistleblower law and employment law, especially on Dodd-Frank, 
Sarbanes-Oxley and False Claims Act actions, and has written several articles on whistleblower protections. 
Zuckerman co-authored a chapter on litigating whistleblower cases for Whistleblowing: The Law of 
Retaliatory Discharge, drafted a chapter on the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act for the D.C. Practice 
Manual, and is a contributing author to The International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. For nearly a 
decade, Zuckerman has been a contributing author to an annual update on the whistleblower-protection 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act published by the ABA Fair Labor Standards Legislation Committee. 
Zuckerman’s articles have been cited in various treatises and in a federal court opinion on the scope of 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection. Zuckerman has trained administrative law judges, agency EEO 
directors, senior OIG officials, and delegations from more than thirty countries on federal whistleblower 
protections. 
In addition to shaping whistleblower-protection law through successful outcomes for clients, 
Zuckerman has worked with whistleblower advocates to draft and lobby for the passage of whistleblower-
protection laws and to advocate for more effective and vigorous enforcement of whistleblower-protection 
laws. Zuckerman drafted portions of the 2009 amendments to the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, which is 
now the strongest public-sector whistleblower-protection statute at the state level, and testified at a hearing 
about those amendments. Zuckerman’s recommendations for improving OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection 
Program are cited in Congressional hearing testimony and a top-to-bottom review of the program, and 
comments that he co-authored are cited in final regulations implementing the whistleblower-protection 
provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act and six environmental statutes.  
Zuckerman serves as Co-Chair of the Whistleblower Subcommittee of the ABA Labor and 
Employment Section’s Employee Rights and Responsibilities Committee and served as Co-Chair of the 
National Employment Lawyers Association’s Whistleblower Committee, Co-Chair of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Subcommittee of the ABA Labor and Employment Fair Labor Standards Legislation Committee, Co-Chair of 
the Whistleblower Committee of the District of Columbia Bar’s Labor and Employment Section, and member 
of Law360’s Employment Editorial Advisory Board. 
Zuckerman graduated Phi Beta Kappa and magna cum laude from Georgetown University and 
received his law degree from the University of Virginia. 
 ∗∗ Tom Devine is the GAP Legal Director and has worked at the organization since 1979. Since that time, 
Tom has assisted over 7000 whistleblowers in defending themselves against retaliation and in making real 
differences on behalf of the public—such as shuttering accident-prone nuclear power plants, rebuffing industry 
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ABSTRACT 
The Trump Administration has promised to “drain the swamp,” combat 
corporate corruption, and root out waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal 
government. To achieve those laudable goals, the new Administration will 
need to appoint effective leaders to the agencies or subagencies charged with 
enforcing whistleblower-protection laws, and Congress will need to preserve 
and, indeed, enhance whistleblower protections in the public and private 
sectors. In this Article, Tom Devine, Legal Director at the Government 
Accountability Project, and Jason Zuckerman, a whistleblower lawyer and 
former Senior Legal Advisor to the Special Counsel at the U.S. Office of 
Special Counsel, provide a detailed agenda for the new Administration to 
ensure effective enforcement of federal whistleblower-protection laws and an 
agenda for Congress to plug significant gaps in whistleblower-protection laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Trump Administration was elected with a mandate to “drain the 
swamp” and combat crony capitalism. The Administration has committed to 
reduce the influence of special interests and “fix a rigged system in which 
political insiders can break the law without consequence and where 
government officials put special interests above the national interest.” 1 
Achieving these laudable objectives requires robust protection of 
 
ploys to deregulate government meat inspection, blocking the next generation of the bloated and porous “Star 
Wars” missile defense systems, and sparking the withdrawal of dangerous prescription drugs such as Vioxx. 
Tom has been a leader in the campaigns to pass or defend thirty-four major national or international 
whistleblower laws, including every one enacted over the past two decades. These include the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989 for federal employees; eleven breakthrough laws since 2002 that create the right to jury 
trials for corporate whistleblowers; and new United Nations, World Bank, and African Development Bank 
policies that legalize public freedom of expression for their own whistleblowers. Tom has also served as an 
“Ambassador to Whistleblowers” in over a dozen nations on trips sponsored by the U.S. State Department. He 
has authored or co-authored numerous books, including 2011’s The Corporate Whistleblower’s Survival 
Guide: A Handbook for Committing the Truth, as well as Courage Without Martyrdom: The Whistleblower’s 
Survival Guide. Tom has published extensive law review articles, magazine articles, and newspaper op-eds, 
and is a frequent expert commentator on television and radio talk shows. Tom is a recipient of the “Hugh M. 
Hefner First Amendment Award” and the “Defender of the Constitution Award,” bestowed by the Fund for 
Constitutional Government. In 2006, he was inducted into the National Freedom of Information Act Hall of 
Fame. 
Tom is a Phi Beta Kappa honors graduate of Georgetown University, earned his J.D. from the 
Antioch School of Law, and sits on the board of the Disaster Accountability Project. 
 1 Donald J. Trump, We Must Clean Up this Corruption, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/06/donald-trump-why-you-should-vote-me/93398970/. 
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whistleblowers in the public and private sectors and significant incentives for 
whistleblowers to risk their careers to disclose fraud. 
Whistleblowers are the canaries in the coal mine. They are our eyes and 
ears on the ground. Whistleblower disclosures are among the most effective 
tools to ensure that we, as a society, are able to address a variety of issues, such 
as caring for our veterans, keeping our country safe, and eliminating wasteful 
spending. Consider the following achievements made possible only by 
whistleblower disclosures: 
• sparking the removal of the painkiller Vioxx, found to cause some 
50,000 fatal heart attacks, as well as obtaining stronger consumer-
safety enforcement for other prescription drugs, including Crestor (for 
lowering cholesterol), Meridia (for weight loss), Bextra (for pain 
relief), Accutane (for acne), Serevent (for asthma), Ketek (for 
sinusitis, bronchitis, and pneumonia), Actonel (an osteoporosis drug), 
ProHeart 6 (a dog medication), and Prevnar (an infant vaccine); 
• exposing and stopping both a former oil-industry lobbyist, who was 
appointed to head the White House Council on Environmental Quality 
and was censoring government reports on climate change, and agency 
gag orders restricting the public communication of critical climate 
change research findings; 
• helping to convince the House of Representatives to vote against legal 
immunity for major telecommunications companies, after disclosing 
that a major telecom’s “Quantico Circuit” provided an unknown third 
party with unfettered access to every mobile communication over its 
network, including phone conversations, emails, and Internet use, 
and—after a series of disclosures by National Security Agency 
whistleblowers through institutional channels, Congress, and 
eventually the media—achieving the passage of the USA Freedom 
Act, which outlaws such government surveillance; 
• forcing the cancellation of an already-approved and nearly complete 
nuclear power plant because its construction was compromised by the 
falsification of X-rays on safety welds, uninspected safety systems, 
and shoddy materials, such as automobile-junkyard metal substituted 
for nuclear-grade steel; 
• exposing systematic illegality and forcing a new cleanup after the 
Three Mile Island nuclear incident by revealing utility-company plans 
to remove a reactor vessel head using a crane whose brakes and 
electrical system were destroyed in the accident (the vessel head 
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consisted of 170 tons of radioactive rubble that, if dropped, could have 
triggered another accident; whistleblowers went public with the 
evidence two days before the head lift was to take place and delayed 
its operation for eighteen months, until the crane was repaired and 
tested); 
• releasing data about possible public exposure to radiation around the 
Hanford, Washington, nuclear waste reservation, where Department of 
Energy (“DOE”) contractors failed to account for 440 billion gallons 
of radioactive waste; 
• shutting down the manufacturing division of a multinational 
corporation that had cornered the market on devices that test the 
accuracy of precision-calibration tools after exposing test results as 
random (averting tragedies arising from defective goods such as heart 
valves, computer equipment, automobiles, and airplanes—any product 
where precise conformance to design specifications means the 
difference between success and failure); 
• precipitating the closure of two incinerators and the cancellation of 
three others, by disclosing that the operating ones had dumped toxic 
substances, such as dioxin, arsenic, chromium, mercury, and other 
heavy metals, into the environment of five states and, in some 
instances, next to churches and schoolyards; 
• sparking public backlashes that forced the government three times to 
abandon its plans to replace its meat inspections with a corporate 
“honor system”; 
• reducing from four days to two hours the amount of time that racially 
profiled minority women going through U.S. Customs could be 
stopped on suspicion of drug smuggling, strip-searched, and held 
incommunicado for hospital laboratory tests, without access to a 
lawyer or even permission to contact family and in the absence of any 
evidence that they engaged in wrongdoing; 
• exposing Transportation Security Administration orders to cancel 
Federal Air Marshal coverage for the highest-risk cross-country 
airplane flights during the middle of a subsequently confirmed, post-
9/11, larger-scale terrorist hijacking alert; the orders were rescinded 
after congressional protests following the disclosure; 
• sparking a top-down removal of upper management at the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) after revealing systematic corruption in 
the DOJ’s program to train police forces of other nations to investigate 
and prosecute government corruption; 
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• exposing failure by U.S. Marine Corps procurement officials to 
deliver mine-resistant vehicles and nonlethal crowd dispersers, which 
caused deaths of Iraqi civilians and one-third of American combat 
deaths and injuries before the whistleblowing disclosure led to 
delivery of the lifesaving equipment; 
• increasing the government’s average annual civil recoveries for fraud 
in government contracts from an average of less than $10 million 
before 1986 to over a billion dollars annually since reviving the False 
Claims Act that year; that law allows whistleblowers to file lawsuits 
challenging fraud in government contracts.2 
We urge the Trump Administration to strengthen whistleblower protections 
as a means to expose waste, fraud, abuse, crime, and other illegal activity. We 
specifically recommend that the new Administration do the following: 
• Fund the programs that protect whistleblowers. The Office of Special 
Counsel (“OSC”), OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Program, and 
other agencies or subagencies that protect whistleblowers are severely 
underfunded and are experiencing unprecedented backlogs. The 
Administration should urge increased funding for these critical 
programs, which protect the public interest and save taxpayer dollars. 
• Advocate for legislation to expand whistleblower protections. While 
Congress strengthened whistleblower protections for federal 
employees in 2012, there are still significant gaps in statutory 
protections available to certain government employees and contractors. 
The Administration should work with Congress to enact appropriate 
legislation to protect these individuals, including providing jury-trial 
access. 
• Protect public- and private-sector employees against retaliation 
through criminal investigations and prosecutions when they engage in 
protected whistleblowing for which it would be unlawful to fire them 
or take other employment actions. 
• Provide independent due-process rights for intelligence-community 
employees and contractors who make lawful whistleblower 
disclosures. 
• Finally, support strengthening and more aggressively enforcing 
current whistleblower-reward laws, such as the qui tam provisions of 
 
 2  TOM DEVINE ET AL., THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR 
COMMITTING THE TRUTH 13–15, 99–104 (Brett-Koehler Publishers eds. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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the False Claims Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) whistleblower-award program, and similar reward laws. 
I. ROOT OUT GOVERNMENT WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE BY PROTECTING 
FEDERAL-EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
During his campaign, President-elect Trump promised to root out waste, 
fraud, and abuse in government, and he often cited the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) as a prime example of government mismanagement. 
To clean up the DVA and effectively identify and cure government corruption 
and waste, it is critical to protect whistleblowers. The Trump Administration 
should, first, strengthen OSC, the agency charged with enforcing the 
Whistleblower Protection Act, as well as the Merit Systems Protection board 
(“MSPB”), which adjudicates cases; second, appoint independent and 
experienced Inspectors General; and, third, enact critical legislative reforms to 
close loopholes in protection and due process for federal workers. 
A. Strengthen OSC’s Enforcement of the WPA and Fund OSC’s Critical Good 
Government Mission 
OSC is an independent federal investigative and prosecutorial agency 
whose primary mission is to safeguard the merit system by protecting federal 
employees and applicants from prohibited personnel practices (“PPP”), 
especially reprisal for whistleblowing, and by providing an independent, secure 
channel for most federal workers to disclose violations of laws, gross 
mismanagement or waste of funds, abuse of authority, and specific dangers to 
public health and safety. OSC “sav[es] taxpayers tens of millions of dollars, 
protects public health and safety, and increases the confidence of the public 
and the federal community in their government” and “promotes a fair and 
effective government, which inspires public confidence by safeguarding 
employee rights and holding government accountable.”3 
Two recent examples illustrate the critical role that OSC plays in 
identifying fraud, waste, and abuse and in promoting accountability: 
1. In FY 2015 and 2016, more than a dozen whistleblowers came to OSC 
to disclose widespread abuse of “administratively uncontrollable 
 
 3  U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2016 4 (2016) [hereinafter OSC 2016 REPORT], available at https://osc.gov/Resources/OSC-FY2016-PAR-
15Nov2016.pdf. 
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overtime” in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 
Because of these disclosures, DHS cracked down on undue overtime 
payments, thereby saving $83.7 million. Congress then adopted a new 
pay system for Border Patrol agents that, per the Congressional 
Budget Office, saves $100 million every year.4 
2. OSC referred to the VA Secretary allegations that employees at the 
Fort Collins Outpatient Clinic in Fort Collins, Colorado, failed to 
follow proper protocols when scheduling patient appointments. The 
VA substantiated the whistleblowers’ allegation that patient 
appointments at Fort Collins were not scheduled according to agency 
policy. Specifically, the clinic “blind scheduled” appointments for 
veterans after an initial appointment had been canceled, in violation of 
VA policy. The clinic also manipulated the “desired date” for 
appointments to show, falsely, that veterans waited for care for shorter 
periods than was actually the case. The VA has taken the 
recommended corrective actions to improve its scheduling practices, 
including disciplining six individuals responsible for the misconduct.5 
These examples are illustrative. The Special Counsel’s role in protecting 
whistleblowers against retaliation is critical, especially because its protection 
enables whistleblowers to make disclosures to Congress, Inspectors General, 
and OSC that reveal significant misconduct and save taxpayers billions of 
dollars. The Senate Report accompanying the Civil Service Reform Act 
(“CSRA”) reveals that Congress was particularly concerned with protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation: 
In the vast federal bureaucracy it is not difficult to conceal 
wrongdoing provided that no one summons the courage to disclose 
the truth. Whenever misdeeds take place in a federal agency, there 
are employees who know that it has occurred, and who are outraged 
by it. What is needed is a means to assure them that they will not 
suffer if they help uncover and correct administrative abuses. What is 
needed is a means to protect the Pentagon employee who discloses 
billions of dollars in cost overruns, the [General Services 
Administration] employee who discloses widespread fraud, and the 
nuclear engineer who questions the safety of certain nuclear plants. 
 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
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These conscientious civil servants deserve statutory protection rather 
than bureaucratic harassment and intimidation.6 
Unfortunately, OSC lacks the resources necessary to effectively enforce the 
WPA. According to its most recent Performance and Accountability Report, 
“the demand for [OSC’s] services continues to outpace the growth in [its] 
resources. OSC is struggling to keep pace with demand and is now facing its 
largest case backlog ever . . . .” 7  This past year, OSC received 6141 new 
matters, a 17% increase over FY 2014 and the first time the agency’s caseload 
exceeded 6000. The 4056 new PPP complaints (an increase of 20%) and 1965 
whistleblower disclosures about wrongdoing in government (a 26% increase) 
were both at record levels.8 
To protect federal-employee whistleblowers, we recommend the following: 
1. Increase funding for OSC. 
2. Appoint a qualified Special Counsel with a record of independence 
and willingness to take bold action to hold agency officials 
accountable for retaliation and other PPPs. 
3. Enact the OSC Reauthorization Act. While House and Senate versions 
are not identical, the most recent attempts to pass this legislation have 
contained much-needed reforms, including: 
o authority for the Special Counsel to act against retaliatory 
investigations, which could be used to nip retaliatory referrals 
for criminal prosecution in the bud; 
o subpoena authority for the Special Counsel to gather evidence 
necessary to prove retaliation when agencies refuse to 
cooperate with investigations; 
o restoration of rights threatened by a judicially imposed, open-
ended, national-security “sensitive jobs” loophole that would 
permit cancellation at will for nearly all federal employees of 
merit system and whistleblower rights; 
o a requirement for the Office to issue regulations spelling out 
whistleblowers’ rights and implementing procedures; and a 
requirement that agencies demonstrate implementation of their 
 
 6  S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 8 (1978). 
 7  OSC 2016 REPORT, supra note 3 at 4. 
 8  Id. 
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corrective-action commitments, after OSC-ordered 
investigations of whistleblower disclosures. 
B. Provide Genuine Whistleblower Protection for FBI Employees 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) currently has one of the least 
effective whistleblower policies in the U.S. Code. CSRA authorized the FBI to 
create its own equivalent system for merit-system principles, including 
whistleblower protection.9 On paper, the FBI had to create a policy equivalent 
to that available to other civil-service employees. The policy was functionally 
nonexistent for over a decade and has since been, compared to the 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, a caricature of rights. The Justice 
Department can make significant improvements to the FBI whistleblower 
regulations through application of the following recommendations, which are 
consistent with the bipartisan FBI Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 
of 2015 (S. 2390). 
S. 2390 would: 
• establish parity with civil-service whistleblowers in terms of the 
scope of their rights for institutional disclosures and temporary 
relief; 
• provide for due-process hearings by Administrative Law Judges; 
• require published opinions on the results of whistleblower 
hearings; 
• require regulations institutionalizing specifics for rights and 
procedures; 
• create judicial review of administrative decisions; and 
• require annual reports on implementation of the stronger rights. 
C. Protect Whistleblowers in the Intelligence Community 
The Trump Administration should continue to work to implement the 
Policy Directive on Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified 
Information (PPD-19) by ensuring strong, independent due-process procedures; 
training so that managers and staff are aware of protections; and training so that 
agencies understand the protections available to government contractors under 
the directive. 
 
 9  5 U.S.C. § 2303 (1980). 
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Senate legislation, S. 794, seeks to restore protections for Intelligence 
Community (“IC”) whistleblowers that were removed in 2012. It would give 
IC-contractor whistleblowers who work through institutional channels the 
same protection against gag orders and retaliation available to all other federal-
contractor employees, including access to jury trials and compensatory 
damages. This legislation has significant potential to reduce leaks of classified 
information to the media by providing a legally safe alternative. During the 
previous administration, whistleblowers who exposed surveillance abuses 
entirely through government channels were harassed or prosecuted under the 
Espionage Act, facing thirty-five years of imprisonment in one case. Edward 
Snowden, who opted to disclose information to the media rather than through 
government channels, has said that the fate of whistleblowers and the 
cancellation of their preexisting rights were factors in his decision.10 
D. Avoid Gutting Due-Process Protections for Federal Workers and 
Weakening the MSPB 
The scandals at the VA and general mistrust of the government have 
precipitated a call for abolishing critical due-process protections for federal 
workers, i.e., imposing at-will employment on the federal workforce.11 Gutting 
such protections is unnecessary and would politicize the federal workforce. In 
other words, personnel decisions that are currently made based on merit would 
be made instead on political affiliation, and the federal workforce would revert 
to a spoils system. 
Contrary to the popular myth, federal employees do not have job security. 
Over FY 2000–2014, more than 77,000 full-time, permanent federal 
employees were discharged because of performance and/or conduct issues.12 
Due to government shutdowns and across-the-board budget cuts that fail to 
assess the relative value of federal programs, top scientists and engineers are 
 
 10  Tom Devine, Protect the Whistleblowers: The Case for Pardoning Snowden, HILL (Nov. 22, 2016, 
6:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/307280-protect-the-whistleblowers-the-
case-for-pardoning.  
 11  Due process includes the right to (1) be notified of the government’s intentions; and (2) receive a 
meaningful opportunity to respond before the action takes place. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., WHAT IS DUE 
PROCESS IN FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT? ii (2015) [hereinafter MSPB, WHAT IS DUE PROCESS?], 
http://www.mspb.gov/mspbsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1166935&version=1171499&application=ACR
OBAT; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
 12  MSPB, WHAT IS DUE PROCESS?, supra note 11, at 53. Appendix A of the report dispels additional 
myths about civil-service due-process protections. 
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already leaving the government for more lucrative and stable work in the 
private sector. Converting the federal workforce to a spoils system would 
hasten the exodus of workers whom the government cannot afford to lose. 
Gutting due-process protections for federal workers would render the 
government unable to attract and retain talent. 
Before the Trump Administration and Congress hastily eliminate due-
process rights for federal workers, it is worth considering why Congress 
enacted those protections more than one hundred years ago: 
Until the early 1880s, the Federal civil service was a patronage or 
“spoils system” in which the President’s administration appointed 
Federal workers based on their political beliefs and support of his 
campaign rather than on their suitability and qualifications to perform 
particular jobs. Over time, this practice contributed to an unstable 
workforce lacking the necessary qualifications to perform their work, 
which in turn adversely affected the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Government and its ability to serve the American people. The 
patronage system continued until President James A. Garfield was 
assassinated by a disgruntled Federal job seeker who felt he was 
owed a Federal job because of his support of the President’s 
campaign. A public outcry for reform resulted in passage of the 
Pendleton Act in 1883. The Pendleton Act created the Civil Service 
Commission (CSC), which monitored and regulated a civil service 
system based on merit and the use of competitive examinations to 
select qualified individuals for Federal positions. This process 
contributed to improvements in Government efficiency and 
effectiveness by helping to ensure that a stable, highly qualified 
Federal workforce, free from partisan political pressure, was 
available to provide capable and effective service to the American 
people. 
During the following decades, it became clear that the CSC 
could not properly, adequately, and simultaneously set managerial 
policy, protect the merit systems, and adjudicate employee appeals. 
Concern over the inherent or perceived conflict of interest in the 
CSC’s role as both the rule-maker and adjudicator of those same 
rules was a principal motivating factor behind the passage of the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). The CSRA replaced the 
CSC with three new agencies: MSPB as the successor to the 
Commission; OPM as the President’s agent for Federal workforce 
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policy and procedure; and the Federal Labor Relations Authority to 
oversee Federal labor-management relations.13 
The primary purpose of the CSRA’s providing review of agencies’ adverse 
employment actions was to ensure that “[e]mployees are . . . protected against 
arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and from partisan political coercion.”14 
The MSPB adjudicates most due-process appeals, and its procedures 
require prompt adjudication. The Board is, and will remain, the only 
independent source of due process for employees to defend their (and the 
public’s) merit-system rights generally and their whistleblower rights 
specifically. It has been a magnet for criticism by whistleblowers and 
congressional critics alike. But since the MSPB will always be whistleblowers’ 
primary chance for a day in court, the Board must be reinforced and 
strengthened. That means (1) appointment of Board members with a proven 
history of experience and commitment to the values underlying merit-system 
and whistleblower rights; (2) training for Administrative Judges whose 
arbitrary, hostile interpretations have stifled the Whistleblower Protection 
Act’s impact; and (3) significantly increased resources necessary to reduce 
multiyear backlogs. 
Returning to a spoils system would not drain the swamp; it would render 
the federal workforce more susceptible to political pressure and corruption. 
E. Authorize Jury Trials in Whistleblower Protection Act Cases 
Federal employees who blow the whistle are the only significant sector of 
the labor force without access to jury trials when seeking to enforce their free-
speech rights. Nearly all economic sectors provide for jury trials. And indeed 
state and municipal employees have access to jury trials in federal court to 
defend their free-speech rights under the First Amendment. 
Until those covered by the Whistleblower Protection Act have access to 
jury trials, their rights will have second-class enforcement and legitimacy. 
While most whistleblowers cannot afford a court trial, an administrative 
hearing is inadequate if the case is technically complex or vulnerable to 
 
 13  U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., ANNUAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS FOR FY 2015 AND ANNUAL 
PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FY 2016 (FINAL) AND 2017 (PROPOSED) (2016) (citations omitted), 
http://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1268947&version=1274024&application=
ACROBAT. 
 14  S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2741. 
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political pressure. Those cases may also be lengthy, requiring resources the 
Board does not have. But they are the most significant reasons to have a 
Whistleblower Protection Act, because they have the greatest impact for the 
public. 
Congress should act promptly, with support from the Trump 
Administration, so that federal employees, like other whistleblowers, may have 
their day in court, with their rights enforced by a jury of the citizens whom 
they purport to risk their careers defending. It is not realistic to expect first-
class service from government employees who have second-class rights and 
are harassed for serving the public. 
F. Strengthen Inspectors General and Hold Them Accountable 
Federal inspectors general (“IG”) combat waste, fraud, and abuse by 
conducting audits and investigations. The Inspector General Act of 1978 
established federal IGs as nonpartisan, independent offices in more than 
seventy federal agencies. They provide recommendations and findings to their 
affiliated agency heads and to Congress that can save the government millions 
of dollars per year. 
The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s 
(“CIGIE”) FY 2015 annual report to the President indicates that the combined 
work of about 13,000 federal OIG employees resulted in potential savings that 
totaled about $36.5 billion. Based on the OIG community’s aggregate budget 
of approximately $2.7 billion, these potential savings represent an about-$14 
return on every dollar invested in OIGs. 
The potential savings includes $26.3 billion from audit recommendations 
agreed to by management and $10.2 billion from investigative receivables and 
recoveries. 
OIGs also strengthened agency programs through the following: 
• 5280 audit, inspection, and evaluation reports issued; 
• 24,246 investigations closed; 
• 545,504 hotline complaints processed; 
• 5717 indictments and criminal information; 
• 5553 successful prosecutions; 
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• 1861 successful civil actions; 
• 7244 suspensions or debarments; and 
• 4501 personnel actions.15 
The Trump Administration should prioritize appointing qualified IGs and 
supporting pending legislation to increase IGs’ access to agency records. 
During the Obama Administration’s first term, several IG positions were 
vacant for years and OIGs were run by acting IGs. Hopefully, the Trump 
Administration will promptly appoint effective and non-partisan IGs. 
Motivated by challenges that IGs face in gaining access to agency records, 
the House of Representatives passed the Inspector General Empowerment Act 
of 2016, H.R. 2395. The Act would authorize IGs to have full and prompt 
access to all agency records, including federal grand-jury materials, and allow 
IGs to subpoena federal contractors and former government employees under 
certain circumstances. 
The Senate version, S. 579, would outlaw retaliatory investigations by IGs 
against whistleblowers. Ironically, OIGs that depend on whistleblowers are 
also the primary source of retaliatory investigations and even referrals for 
criminal prosecution, due to investigative requests by agency managers who 
conceal their agendas. To comply with the new ban, as a practical matter, OIGs 
would have to check whether the target of an investigative request had engaged 
in protected activity, and whether the OIG was being used for a hidden, 
retaliatory agenda. 
But Congress and the new Administration should also take measures to 
ensure that IGs are held accountable. IGs have broad powers, including law-
enforcement powers, and protections that support their independence. 16 
Unfortunately, some IGs have abused their power and performed politicized 
investigations designed to garner headlines rather than carry out their 
important duties under the IG Act. CIGIE investigates alleged misconduct by 
OIG officials. Recent investigations of IG misconduct call into question 
 
 15  COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION 
HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE TRANSITION TO A NEW ADMINISTRATION 12–13 
(2016), available at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Presidential_Transition_Handbook_Web. 
pdf. 
 16  WENDY GINSBERG & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FED. INSPECTORS GENERAL: 
HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS 6 (2016), available at http://www.fas. 
org/sgp/crs/misc/R43814.pdf. 
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whether CIGIE adequately deters IG misconduct, and it is not surprising that 
IGs are disinclined to hold other IGs accountable. Accordingly, the Trump 
Administration should consider putting other mechanisms into place to ensure 
that IGs do not abuse their power and that they are held accountable. 
II. COMBAT CORPORATE FRAUD THROUGH CREDIBLE ENFORCEMENT OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER-PROTECTION LAWS 
Following the massive accounting fraud that led to the collapse of Enron, 
WorldCom, and other companies, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”), which includes a broad whistleblower-protection provision “to 
encourage and protect those who report fraudulent activity that can damage 
innocent investors in publicly traded companies.”17 The legislative history of 
SOX reveals that Enron succeeded in perpetuating fraud against shareholders 
due in large part to a “corporate code of silence,” which “discourage[d] 
employees from reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper 
authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, but even internally.”18 Though a few 
SOX whistleblowers have achieved success at trial, OSHA’s Whistleblower 
Protection Program is failing to enforce SOX, due mainly to its crushing 
caseload. 
Recent news reports revealed that, years ago, dozens of Wells Fargo 
employees filed SOX retaliation complaints, alleging that the company 
retaliated against them for raising red flags about corporate and consumer 
financial fraud. Indeed, as early as 2010, whistleblowers were providing 
evidence about the widespread fraud that recently resulted in Wells Fargo’s 
paying $185 million in fines.19 Both Wells Fargo and OSHA ignored those 
early warnings. Wells Fargo, in fact, terminated the employment of someone, 
who served as a personal banker at the St. Helena branch in the Napa Valley 
from 2008 to 2010, soon after she alerted the company that bankers had 
opened fake customer accounts to meet sales goals. When the banker filed a 
complaint with OSHA, no one investigated it for six months; the case was 
ultimately dismissed when she pursued it in court. Other cases brought by 
Wells Fargo whistleblowers have been pending with OSHA for years. And 
 
 17  S. Rep. No. 107-146, 2002 WL 863249, at *19 (2002). 
 18  Id. at *4–5. 
 19  E.g., Mark Villarreal & Liz Wagner, Dozens of Wells Fargo Employees Filed Whistleblower 
Complaints with Feds, New Data Shows, NBC BAY AREA (Nov. 22, 2016, 11:05 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea. 
com/investigations/Dozens-of-Wells-Fargo-Employees-Filed-Whistleblower-Complaints-with-Feds-New-
Data-Shows—402566925.html. 
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there are similar examples of OSHA’s inability to quickly investigate claims of 
retaliation against whistleblowers who disclosed threats to nuclear, food, and 
transportation safety. As Congress explores options to slash agency budgets, it 
should consider increasing, not decreasing, the budget for OSHA’s 
Whistleblower Protection Program (“WPP”). 
A. Reform and Fund OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Program 
OSHA’s WPP enforces twenty-two whistleblower-protection laws. Audits 
of the WPP in recent years have repeatedly confirmed that OSHA’s 
insurmountable caseload undermines the ability of investigators to conduct 
thorough investigation and enforce these laws effectively. For example, a 2010 
GAO report identified significant deficiencies in the program.20 
Though OSHA leadership has implemented several improvements to the 
program, a recent DOL OIG report identified additional deficiencies, including 
that OSHA did not consistently ensure that complaint reviews under the 
Whistleblower Programs were complete, sufficient, and timely.21 Seventy-two 
percent of whistleblower investigations exceeded statutory timeframes by an 
average of 163 days. 22  The Trump Administration should implement the 
recommendations in the OIG report and should foster increased cooperation 
between OSHA and other agencies. For example, whistleblower-retaliation 
complaints about consumer financial fraud filed with OSHA should be shared 
with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to enable the CFPB 
to investigate the alleged fraud. OSHA currently waits until investigations are 
completed to share the whistleblowers’ evidence of corporate misconduct with 
relevant law-enforcement agencies—that can mean delaying protection of the 
public for years and withholding evidence that could make a difference. 
The DOL OIG recommends that OSHA: 
1. monitor the whistleblower programs to routinely assess their 
efficiency and effectiveness, and finalize and implement the draft 
 
 20 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT 
ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROGRAM WEAKNESSES (2010), available at http://www. 
gao.gov/new.items/d10722.pdf. 
 21 See OFFICE OF AUDIT, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA NEEDS TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN ITS 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS (2015), available at http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2015/ 
02-15-202-10-105.pdf. 
 22 Id. at 7. 
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checklist to assist in determining if investigators completed steps and 
collected documentation to support determinations; 
2. develop and monitor specific performance measures or indicators to 
ensure that whistleblower programs are working as intended; 
3. provide complete and unified guidance to ensure that appropriate 
methods are used to close investigations; 
4. issue an updated manual and implement controls to ensure that the 
manual will continue to be timely updated to reflect current policies, 
procedures, and statutes; 
5. develop and provide investigators with a comprehensive training 
curriculum to ensure that they have the proper skills, knowledge, and 
understanding of program requirements and goals; 
6. develop and implement a process to ensure that reasonable balance is 
applied between quality and timeliness to complete investigations 
within statutory timeframes; and 
7. develop and implement a formal process and working relationships 
with other agencies to ensure that information is timely shared to 
assist in the enforcement of the various statutes and correction of 
violations.23 
We recommend that OSHA take two additional steps to improve the WPP: 
1. Offer complainants an option to litigate their claims at the Department 
of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges if OSHA has not 
completed its investigation within 120 days of the filing of a 
complaint. 
2. Perform an independent audit of the regional office’s interpretations of 
the whistleblower-protection laws. 
B. Appoint Qualified Administrative Review Board Judges Who Are 
Committed to the Rule of Law 
The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) issues final agency decisions 
for the Secretary of Labor in cases arising under a wide range of worker-
protection laws, including the whistleblower-protection and federal-service-
contracts laws enforced by DOL. According to the DOL website, the ARB’s 
“mission is to issue legally correct, just, and timely decisions.”24 
 
 23  Id. at 3. 
 24  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR Administrative Review Board Establishment and Mission, https://www.dol.gov/ 
arb/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
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The ARB, appointed by Secretary Chao during the George W. Bush 
Administration, was hostile to whistleblower-protection laws and issued 
opinions that imposed several obstacles to whistleblowing that contradicted the 
plain meaning of numerous whistleblower-protection laws. The Chao ARB 
gutted the whistleblower-protection provision of SOX by adding several 
hurdles and loopholes that Congress never envisioned. In addition, the Chao 
ARB wrote many results-oriented decisions that reversed the rare wins that 
whistleblowers had achieved in hearings before DOL administrative law 
judges. Such decisions lacked credible legal analysis and appeared to be 
designed to deter whistleblowers from prosecuting their claims. 
Fortunately, ARB members appointed by Secretary Solis and Secretary 
Perez have issued many scholarly decisions that restored whistleblower rights 
and faithfully applied the plain language of the whistleblower-protection laws. 
Federal courts of appeals have adopted and deferred to these well-reasoned 
decisions. But if Wall Street lobbyists can handpick judges who will politicize 
the ARB and gut SOX’s whistleblower-protection provision, then corporate 
whistleblowers will be silenced. And if a Trump Secretary of Labor appoints 
activist judges with an agenda to gut whistleblower-protection laws, then the 
institutional legitimacy of the ARB will be undermined because its opinions 
will be perceived as politically driven. 
The Secretary of Labor in the Trump Administration should appoint 
qualified ARB members who are committed to applying the plain meaning and 
intent of the whistleblower-protection laws, not ideologues eager to devitalize 
the whistleblower-protection laws. 
III. USE WHISTLEBLOWER-REWARD LAWS TO COMBAT FRAUD ON THE 
GOVERNMENT, REDUCE THE DEFICIT, AND PROTECT INVESTORS 
A. Protect the Public Fisc by Enforcing the False Claims Act 
Health care fraud costs taxpayers at least $60 billion annually.25 The most 
effective tool to combat fraud on the government is the whistleblower or qui 
tam provision of the False Claims Act (FCA). Under the FCA, a successful qui 
tam relator can recover 15 percent to 30 percent of the government’s total 
recovery in a suit for the knowing presentment of a false or fraudulent claim 
 
 25  Jim Avila, Medicare Funds Totaling $60 Billion Improperly Paid, Report Finds, ABC NEWS (Jul 23, 
2015) http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/medicare-funds-totaling-60-billion-improperly-paid-report/story?id=326 
04330.  
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for payment or approval by the government or other violations of the FCA. 
Examples of fraudulent schemes or practices include double billing, upcoding, 
kickbacks, off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals, Medicare cost report fraud, 
billing for work not performed, providing defective equipment to the military, 
and performing unnecessary medical procedures. Qui tam actions brought by 
whistleblowers have enabled the federal government to recover more than $50 
billion.26 
The Trump Administration should use this indispensable tool to hold 
government contractors and grantees accountable for fraud and oppose 
attempts by lobbyists for fraudsters to weaken or gut the False Claims Act. In 
particular, the Trump Administration should oppose 1) caps on whistleblower 
award, which would reduce the incentive for relator counsel to invest 
substantial resources to investigate and prosecute FCA claims; and 2) 
requirements for whistleblowers to report fraud to their employers as a 
prerequisite for filing a qui tam action, which would expose whistleblowers to 
retaliation and permit fraudsters to cover-up or destroy evidence before the 
government has a chance to investigate the fraud. And President-elect Trump 
should oppose any reduction in funding of the investigations and prosecution 
of False Claims Act violations, including the successful Department of Health 
and Human Services and Department of Justice Health Care Fraud Prevention 
and Enforcement Action Team. 
B. Reduce the Deficit by Rewarding Tax Whistleblowers 
The IRS estimates that the United States loses $450 billion per year to tax 
evasion and underpayments. 27  In 2006, Congress enacted legislation that 
provides robust incentives for whistleblowers to report large-scale tax fraud.28 
Since fiscal year 2007, the IRS has collected more than $2 billion in tax 
underpayments due to whistleblower disclosures.29 A notable success of the 
IRS Whistleblower Program is Brad Birkenfeld, whose disclosure led to the 
 
 26  Sen. Grassley, False Claims Act is Our Most Important Tool to Fight Fraud against Taxpayers, 
Statement for the Record by Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee At a 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on the constitution and Civil Justice Hearing on “Oversight of the False Claims 
Act” April 28, 2016, in http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-false-claims-act-our-
most-important-tool-fight-fraud-against-taxpayers. 
 27  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: BILLIONS COLLECTED, 
BUT TIMELINESS AND COMMUNICATION CONCERNS MAY DISCOURAGE WHISTLEBLOWERS 2 (2015), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673440.pdf. 
 28  Id. at 4–5. 
 29  Id. at 23. 
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collection of more than $1 billion in illegal offshore tax evasion and an award 
of $104 million. 
The GAO has found that the whistleblower-claim-review process takes 
several years to complete. Claims lasted 4 to 7.5 years, from the submission of 
the Form 211 to the award payment.30 Much of this time was spent with the 
Whistleblower Office (“WO”)—claims were not paid until about 1.5 to 4.5 
years after the OD sent the Form 11369 to the WO for an award evaluation.31 
Unlike other whistleblower laws, the statute does not provide individuals 
with protections against retaliation. This has likely dissuaded many tax 
whistleblowers from reporting valuable information. Tax professionals often 
work in highly specialized areas within companies, where a limited number of 
employees are privy to specific information. Without protection, individuals 
may not risk their job security and financial well-being to report tax 
underpayments. The GAO has therefore recommended that Congress consider 
providing whistleblowers with legal protections against employer retaliation.32 
A 2016 audit report by the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration (“TIGTA”) outlined additional issues that the WO should 
address to continue the success of the tax whistleblower program.33 First, the 
TIGTA audit revealed that the WO does not have appropriate controls in place 
for oversight of claims processing. 34  This failure to implement adequate 
controls has led to inaccurate data, inconsistent coding of the claims, and an 
overall increase in time to process the claims.35 TIGTA suggested that the WO 
design and implement sufficient controls to ensure the consistent, appropriate, 
and expeditious processing of whistleblower claims.36 
Next, the TIGTA audit report found that the IRS should improve its 
communications with whistleblowers.37 Specifically, the report highlighted the 
 
 30  Id. at 15. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. at 43. 
 33  See generally Treasury Inspector Gen. For Tax Admin., The Whistleblower Program Helps Identify 
Tax Noncompliance; However, Improvements Are Needed to Ensure that Claims Are Processed Appropriately 
and Expeditiously (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2016reports/201630059fr.pdf. 
(Bluebook rule 18.2). 
 34 Id.at 23.  
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 31-32. 
 37  Id. at “Highlights”. 
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IRS’s failure to properly support rejection and denial decisions.38 For example, 
the IRS has issued boilerplate denial letters to whistleblowers that state simply: 
“[The IRS] did not use the information [the whistleblowers] provided, did not 
proceed with an administrative or judicial action against the taxpayers based on 
[the whistleblowers’] information, and did not collect tax proceeds based on 
[the whistleblowers’] information.” 39  The unsupported denials serve to 
undermine whistleblowers’ confidence in the program and frustrate judicial 
review. 
Finally, the TIGTA audit report found that the IRS has failed to contact 
whistleblowers for debriefings.40 In an August 2014 memorandum to the WO, 
the IRS Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement stressed the 
importance of debriefing whistleblowers when necessary to clarify 
information: 
Some whistleblowers have insights and information which can 
help the [IRS] understand complex issues or hidden relationships. 
Debriefing of the whistleblower, whether in person or by telephone, 
is an invaluable and crucial component of the evaluation of the 
information prior to a decision on whether the information should be 
referred to the field for [examination] or investigation. A debriefing 
interview can identify connections between the taxpayer and others 
who may have had a significant role in the alleged noncompliance. 
The whistleblower may also be able to explain and clarify documents 
and information submitted with the Form 211.41 
Despite these issues, the WO has successfully collected billions in tax 
underpayments and issued more than $400 million in awards to 
whistleblowers. 42  In 2015 alone, the WO made ninety-nine awards to 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  Order and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, Anonymous 1 & Anonymous 2 v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, No. 12472-11W, slip op at 1 (T.C. May 10, 2013), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ 
InternetOrders/DocumentViewer.aspx?IndexSearchableOrdersID=103945&Todays=Y. 
 40  TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM HELPS IDENTIFY TAX 
NONCOMPLIANCE; HOWEVER, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT CLAIMS ARE PROCESSED 
APPROPRIATELY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2016reports/ 
201630059fr.pdf. (Bluebook rule 18.2). 
 41  Memorandum from John M. Dalrymple, IRS Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enf’t, to the Whistleblower 
Office 2 (Aug. 20, 2014) https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/IRS%20Whistleblower%20Program% 
20Memorandum%20(signed%20by%20DCSE).pdf. 
 42 IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/WB_Annual_Report_FY_15_Final%20Ready%20for%20Commission
er%20Feb%208.pdf.  
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whistleblowers, which totaled more than $103 million.43 The WO clearly is an 
important tool to narrow the tax gap. The IRS Whistleblower Program has the 
potential to continue its success by remediating known issues and instilling 
confidence in whistleblowers to come forward with information about large-
scale tax underpayments. 
C. Protect Investors by Rewarding Whistleblowing to the SEC 
Press reports indicate that a repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act is among the top 
policy priorities of the Trump Administration. 44 Though some Dodd-Frank 
provisions may warrant reexamination, the Act’s very successful 
whistleblower-reward program should not be repealed. The program has 
generated more than 18,000 tips, thereby enabling the SEC to recover $584 
million in penalties. 45  Some of those tips have equipped the SEC to halt 
ongoing fraud and prevent investors from losing millions of dollars. 
Nearly four years after the SEC Whistleblower Program announced its first 
award, in 2012, it appears that the program is now firing on all cylinders. In 
2016 alone, the program has issued more than $75 million in awards to 
whistleblowers46, which is more than the agency awarded in all the previous 
years of the program combined.47 These whistleblowers have helped the SEC 
to identify fraud that might otherwise have gone undetected. In addition, these 
whistleblowers have provided strong evidence that has enabled the SEC to 
advance investigations while conserving time and resources. 
As SEC Chair Mary Jo White noted in an April 2015 speech, the SEC 
“continue[s] to receive higher quality tips that are of tremendous help to the 
Commission in stopping ongoing and imminent fraud, and lead to significant 
enforcement actions on a much faster timetable than we would be able to 
 
 43  Id. 
 44  See e.g., Jesse Hamilton & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Trump’s Transition Team Pledges to Dismantle 
Dodd-Frank Act, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:07 PM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-
10/trump-s-transition-team-pledges-to-dismantle-dodd-frank-act; Ryan Tracy, Donald Trump’s Transition 
Team: We Will ‘Dismantle’ Dodd-Frank Act, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2016) http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
donald-trumps-transition-team-we-will-dismantle-dodd-frank-1478800611. (Bluebook rule 18.2 and 16.6(f)). 
 45  Editor, SEC Whistleblower Program Records Best Year, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, (Nov. 26, 
2016 7:57 AM) http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/sec-whistleblower-program-records-best-
year/. (Bluebook rule 18.2). 
 46  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM 1 (2016) [hereinafter SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/ 
annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2016.pdf. 
 47  Id. 
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achieve without the information and assistance from the whistleblower.”48 The 
most common tips relate to corporate disclosure violations, offering fraud, 
stock manipulation, and insider trading.49 
According to the SEC Whistleblower Program’s 2016 annual report to 
Congress, whistleblower tips are on the rise.50 In 2016, whistleblowers from 
sixty-seven foreign countries filed claims with the SEC.51 The international 
breadth of the whistleblower program is necessary to halt fraud in a now-
global economy. In fact, the largest whistleblower award to date—more than 
$30 million52—was issued to a foreign whistleblower who provided the SEC 
with information about ongoing fraud that the agency admitted would 
otherwise “have been very difficult to detect”. 53  The SEC Whistleblower 
Program has issued a total of eight awards to whistleblowers living in foreign 
countries.54 
The increase in whistleblower tips has brought higher quality information, 
which has assisted the SEC in uncovering the biggest frauds. In 2016, the SEC 
Whistleblower Program has issued seven of the top ten whistleblower awards 
in the program’s history.55 These tips alone have allowed the SEC to protect 
investors from losing hundreds of millions of dollars. 
We recommend that the SEC continue to rely on whistleblowers to protect 
investors from fraud and ensure the integrity of U.S. markets. The SEC 
whistleblower program has been a low-cost and effective enforcement solution 
for securities-law violations. In 2015, the SEC’s total program cost was 
approximately $1.6 billion. 56 To put this expense into perspective, the top 
 
 48  Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC as the Whistleblower’s Advocate (Apr. 30, 
2015), in https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-remarks-at-garrett-institute.html. (Bluebook rule 
17.2.6). 
 49  Id. 
 50  SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46 at 23.  
 51  Id. at 26. 
 52  Id. at 10. 
 53  Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Largest-Ever Whistleblower Award (Sept. 22, 
2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290. 
 54  SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 18. 
 55  Whistleblower Awards for Tips Resulting in Enforcement Actions, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-100million. 
 56  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015 44 (2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2015.pdf. 
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hedge-fund manager in 2015 made $1.7 billion. 57 The new Administration 
should strengthen the SEC’s whistleblower program, which would allow the 
agency to act on more whistleblower tips, halt ongoing fraud more quickly, 
and protect more investors. This would be consistent with the new 
Administration’s promise to combat corruption. 
In addition, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower should continue to bolster 
the program by enforcing the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition against retaliation 
and Rule 21F-17 of the Act, which prohibits companies from using gag clauses 
in employment or severance agreements to prevent whistleblowers from 
providing information to the SEC. 58  This protection enables employees to 
confidently report fraud or violations to the SEC without fear of retaliation by 
their employers or of losing their severance pay and benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
To achieve its goals of combating waste, fraud and abuse and restoring 
trust in government, the Trump Administration should protect and reward 
whistleblowers. 
 
 57  Stephen Taub, The 2016 Rich List of the World’s Top-Earning Hedge Fund Managers, INSTITUTIONAL 
INV’R’S ALPHA (May 10, 2016) http://www.institutionalinvestorsalpha.com/Article/3552805/The-2016-Rich-
List-of-the-Worlds-Top-Earning-Hedge-Fund-Managers.html. 
 58  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2011). 
